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Abstract
This paper explores the implications, from a public sector economics point
of view, of combining welfare assessments concerning land use in urban and
environmental economics respectively. Urban economics has a long tradition
in determining the optimal allocation of land (or space) as a consumption
good, while land use issues in environmental economics are predominantly
rooted in hedonic pricing as a valuation method for optimising the allocation
of public goods. Recently, hedonic pricing methods have been extended by
adopting location choice models for the valuation of non-marginal changes in
levels of local amenities. Following a possible revision of the location choices
by the population, endogenous prices are introduced and compensated for
in a willingness to pay. Some of the new methods also allow for social inter-
actions by means of endogenous amenities. While endogenous prices are the
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1main contribution of these so-called sorting models to the valuation litera-
ture, until now little attention has been paid to the eﬃciency of the market
equilibrium assumed, in terms of the consumption of space. This is surpris-
ing, because social interactions as endogenous amenities might alternatively
be interpreted as positive external eﬀects. As such, they are likely to result
in an oversupply of land in a competitive market. The dominant character-
isation of the equilibrium on the land (or housing) market in sorting models
is market clearing, given a ﬁxed supply. In this paper, the total amount
of land used in the market clearing equilibrium will be compared with the
competitive market equilibrium and the allocation by a benevolent social
planner maximising social welfare. It is shown that under relatively general
conditions and allowing for endogenous amenities, locational sorting models
with a ﬁxed supply make strong assumptions regarding the optimal total
amount of land used and that in a competitive market this amount is larger
than in the case of land use planning. This result suggests that in public
policy recommendations, sorting models could beneﬁt from complementing
the valuation methodology with the internalisation of external eﬀects for
optimising land use.
Keywords: Environmental Issues, Theory, Land Use, Locational Sorting,
Welfare Economics
JEL Classiﬁcation: Q58, R52, D61
21 Introduction
When taking into account the price for land or housing, a formalisation of the
land or housing market is needed. Traditionally the land market receives atten-
tion from various economic subdisciplines. Land in spatial economics is considered
a consumption good or production factor, with a corresponding market, sometimes
identiﬁed as the housing market for simplicity, when referred to as a rental market
for location space. In environmental economics land plays a role in property valua-
tion, where the value of land is assessed in revealed preference methods, especially
hedonic pricing; again often projected on housing. And in ﬁnance land is consid-
ered an asset—with extensions to real estate in general—, competing with other
investments in diversiﬁed risk portfolios or as a basis for a credit loan (mortgage).
These diﬀerent approaches highlight diﬀerent aspects of land in economics.
Leaving aside for the moment the asset quality of land, primarily because of the
complication of introducing time as yet another dimension, besides space, the
question arises which combination of elements from spatial and environmental
economics would serve policy interests concerning land markets from a social wel-
fare perspective. Both perspectives seem to accommodate diﬀerent deﬁnition of
eﬃciency. On one side there is the spatial economics and capitalisation literature
stressing the optimal allocation of land through markets, while on the other side
the environmental economics and valuation literature put forward the public good
character of local (environmental) quality. From a public policy point of view,
an ideal welfare measure would address both aspects simultaneously. If, in a ﬁrst
assessment, the quality of a location would indeed be considered a local public
good, exogenous to both consumer and producer (developer), two goods would be
traded simultaneously on a land market:
1. land, as a consumer good or production factor, as in the spatial economics
3land use tradition of von Th¨ unen (1826),
2. quality, as a local public good (amenity, environmental quality) in the tradi-
tion of M¨ aler (1974).
In this stylised case, public policy is confronted with two aspects of a socially
optimal allocation of land:
1. securing optimal allocation of land by markets,
2. supplying local public goods.
Recently, hedonic pricing methods have been extended by adopting location choice
models for the valuation of non-marginal changes in levels of local amenities Tim-
mins (2003); Smith et al. (2004); Bayer et al. (2005). These so-called locational
sorting models provide a good starting point. However, since the location choice
model is usually limited to deriving demand functions with a ﬁxed supply, the
aspect of optimal land use is not addressed. This paper shows how location choice
models could in principle be extended with an endogenous total amount of resi-
dential land in order to cover both aspects simultaneously.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses diﬀerent perspectives
on land use in economic theory. In section 3 a model will be developed that
addresses the main issues stated above. A welfare analysis with this model is
presented in section 4. Conclusions are stated in section 5.
42 Land use in economics
In the next two subsections an overview will be given on the traditional focus
on land use in environmental and urban economics respectively. In subsection
2.3, the two aspects of land use mentioned above are highlighted and the relation
with recently introduced location choice models in environmental economics is
addressed.
2.1 Land use in environmental economics
Housing prices have been used extensively for a long time already in environmental
economics. In that respect, the perspective on land use in environmental economics
seems to have been dominated by the theoretic underpinnings of hedonic pricing
by Rosen (1974). Rosen proposed a perfectly competitive market for the charac-
teristics of consumer goods, making use of a bid rent concept, thereby referring to
Alonso (Rosen, 1974, p. 38). In the context of methods applied in environmental
economics in general (not restricted to land use), hedonic pricing has a special
position. It is one of the few valuation methods with an explicit reference to mar-
ket prices. Many other methods rather deal exclusively with the valuation of pure
public goods. Starting with M¨ aler (1974), environmental economics has devel-
oped a theoretical basis for incorporating public goods and external eﬀects—more
generally, non-market goods—in an essentially neoclassical framework.
In broad terms, non-market goods can be thought of as all goods that aﬀect well-
being, but which are not traded on a market. Environmental quality for example
is assumed to be consumed, but there is no market for it. This allows for a
clear separation in the analysis of the maximisation of welfare from the allocation
mechanism. If people would consume only goods that are traded on markets, the
5price mechanism under perfect competition would secure an optimal allocation
and thereby yield a maximum level of social well-being. If markets were to supply
environmental quality, it would typically lead to an under-supply, by familiar ar-
guments that apply for public goods. From a welfare economics point of view, the
state therefore has to intervene in the allocation, either by regulation or by taking
care of supply itself.
The most rigorous implementation concerning the valuation of pure public goods
is the contingent valuation method (CVM). Because public goods lack a market
for achieving an eﬃcient allocation, diﬀerent criteria had to be developed. M¨ aler
(1974) proposed a concept of shadow prices, or virtual prices, for public goods
that is consistent with regular deﬁnitions of expenditure minimisation, compen-
sated (Hicksian) demand and compensating or equivalent variation. The problem
of expenditure minimisation is the dual problem to utility maximisation. The fo-
cus on expenditure minimisation in environmental economics can be explained by
the goal of ﬁnding a monetary measure for welfare. For keeping the same level of
welfare, while changing the supply of non-market goods, a minimal amount of vir-
tual money can be derived. For market goods a change in price results in a change
of the Hicksian consumer’s surplus that equals the diﬀerence in the expenditure
needed to maintain the same level of utility. With a similar deﬁnition for changes
in the supply of non-market goods, a willingness to pay (WTP) can be derived,
that serves as a monetary measure for the value of the change in (environmental)
quality. The willingness to pay corresponds to a marginal WTP integrated over
the amenity improvement. This yields something similar to a Hicksian consumer’s
surplus for price changes, with the public good treated as a quantity. The general
result maintains that the allocation of public goods which yields the highest WTP
would also yield the highest increase in utility, and is therefore optimal.
62.2 Land use in urban economics
In spatial economics the concept of the bid rent also plays a central role in land use
models. The best-documented tradition of land use models in economics employing
a bid rent dates back to von Th¨ unen (1826) for agricultural land use. Von Th¨ nen’s
method was extended by Alonso (1964) for location choices of consumers. These
prototype models of land use in economics have always been interpreted as being
part of the neoclassical economics tradition, because they conform to the conditions
of competitive markets. They have also often been criticised, because of their
unrealistic assumptions. However, it seems fair to say that the assumptions are
the price of maintaining a reference to the neoclassical framework, identifying
market allocation with welfare maximisation. In the land use models of economics,
or more particularly urban economics, the market equilibrium price for land is
assumed to be identical to the maximum bid rent that represents the price a
consumer is willing to pay as the rental price for space, after travel or transport
costs are subtracted from her income. Travel or transport costs are the only
connotation with geography, as they are calculated based on the distance to a
single, exogenously given Central Business District (CBD), or market place. The
existence and location of the CBD itself is not explained in traditional urban
economics. With location simpliﬁed to ‘distance to the CBD’ accounted for in
transportation costs, elements of geography are exclusively introduced as location
dependent net income; i.e., net of transportation costs.
2.3 Land use and social welfare
The question arises, which combination of elements from spatial and environmen-
tal economics would serve policy interests concerning land markets from a social
welfare perspective best. On one hand the environmental economics tradition is
7concerned with the supply of non-market goods, while urban economics focuses on
the market allocation of land. However, if in Rosen (1974)’s theoretical justiﬁca-
tion for the use of hedonic pricing one or more characteristics of the market good is
labelled quality, certain quantity and quality combinations can only be consumed
together. From the perspective of the consumer, pure public goods are interpreted
as exogenously given non-market goods and are entirely beyond the control of the
consumer or producer. In this sense, the value of the local environmental quality
of a location could still be derived as in hedonic pricing from the market price,
even though it concerns a pure public good. The phenomenon is known as capi-
talisation. The value of non-market good is said to be capitalised in the market
price for land or housing, because the demand for land (quantity) is aﬀected by
the demand for quality. In this stylised case, public policy is confronted with two
aspects of a socially optimal allocation of land: the eﬃciency of allocation of land
by markets and the supply of local public goods.
Most analyses of the relation between the supply of local public goods and the
impact on social welfare in a spatial context can be found in the public ﬁnance
literature that takes Tiebout (1956) as a starting point. Tiebout proposed to
interpret a special kind of spatial equilibrium, where a population is distributed
over a given number of municipalities—as equivalent to a market equilibrium.
The size of the population in a municipality would represent the demand for the
locally supplied public good, determining in equilibrium its aggregate price as the
municipal expenditure. Tiebout however, does not refer to capitalisation of the
value of the public good in property prices directly.
In the next section, it will be shown that an alternative location choice model, in
which the local quality characteristic is interpreted analogously to the distance
to the CBD itself, is suitable for addressing simultaneously capitalisation and
total land consumption. The main inspiration for this approach is supplied by
8a relatively new valuation method, which is based on so-called locational sorting
models (Bayer et al., 2005) and the concept of a general equilibrium to pay (GE-
WTP) (Smith et al., 2004). A GE-WTP should be able to account for the value
of non-marginal changes in a spatially explicit distribution of local public goods,
thereby extending current hedonic pricing methodology. Commonly, such a GE-
WTP is derived as a Hicksian WTP adjusted for endogenous prices. Endogenous
prices are typically enforced by a market clearing condition, often a ﬁxed supply,
constraining the relocation of a population in response to the changes in local
quality. This strongly resembles the set-up of the basic urban economics models
in the Alonso tradition. For a closed city model in urban economics however, also
the city size is endogenous. Therefore, a WTP that also allows for variation in
the total amount of land used for residential purpose would be a suitable basis for
further exploration of the combined welfare eﬀects of quality and quantity aspects.
Existing locational sorting models, however, commonly assume that the total sup-
ply of housing is ﬁxed. The population is thereby assumed to resort over the
existing housing stock. This paper ﬁrst develops a simpliﬁed theoretical equiva-
lent to sorting models in section 3, which will be used to explore the implications
of an endogenous total supply of residential area in section 5. This will facilitate
an interpretation of a GE-WTP relative to an eﬃcient supply of land.
93 Model
The main problem to be addressed in this paper will be stated in the next subsec-
tion. In subsection 3.2 the aggregate and the individual model will be developed
for a Cobb-Douglas utility function, with an interpretation in subsection 3.3. Both
will be used in the welfare analysis in section 4.
3.1 Problem background
Given a utilitarian social welfare function for a population of identical agents, by
means of the sum of the indirect utilities for all agents over all locations, changes
in supplied level of a single public good, q, can be valued using an aggregate
willingness to pay (WTP) according to a compensation in income that is deﬁned
by (see e.g. Haab and McConnell (2002))
V (Y,P,q) = V (Y − WTPPE,P,q
∗). (3.1)
Following Smith et al. (2004) this WTP is labelled partial equilibrium. The price
index P contains the price levels for land or housing at all locations. If q is assumed
to reﬂect the level of one non-spatial pure public good, the price index would not
be aﬀected by a change to level q∗. But if q is the vector of the levels of local
public goods (one per location), the eﬀect of capitalisation on the prices for land
of changes in elements of q would be captured in
V (Y,P,q) = V (Y − WTPGE,P
∗,q
∗). (3.2)
The change of the price index for housing to changes in levels of local public goods
could be interpreted as the response of the housing market. In a model with supply
10and demand for housing, these prices are endogenous. Hence, the speciﬁcation of
both supply and demand are necessary.
3.2 Cobb-Douglas case
The social welfare function (3.1) was deﬁned as the sum of individual indirect
utility levels. With N individuals and M locations, the number of individuals, nj,
at each location j can be expressed as the fraction times the size of the population,
Nxj. This results in the equivalence of the social welfare function and N times







xjvj = Nv. (3.3)
Since it was assumed that all agents were identical and if the population is large
enough, this average, v, might be interpreted as the expected indirect utility level of
the individual. This probabilistic interpretation typically adopted in the discrete
choice literature (McFadden, 1984). Based on that literature, in this paper the
individual indirect utility will be given by
lnvj = lny − β lnpj + γ lnqj + εij. (3.4)
Speciﬁcation (3.4) is inspired by the locational sorting literature in Bayer et al.
(2005), especially Timmins (2003). Here, ε is a i.i.d. error function that has a
variance that is linearly dependent on µ. The probability of an individual choosing
location location j is given by the conditional logit(McFadden, 1984), which is




































Expression (3.6) follows from the individual decision problem
max
sj,z uj (sj,z) s.t y = z + pjsj, (3.7)
with






where α ≡ β−β (1 − β)
−(1−β) for convenience. The individual demand for space at





Aggregate demand at location j follows from







A ﬁxed supply per location that equals A and equating demand and supply (market
clearing),

























Finally, for simplicity, it will be assumed that µ ↓ 0 and thereby εij ↓ 0. This


















































Equation (3.15) is suitable for an interpretation in terms of (3.2), but ﬁrst a
broader range of interpretations concerning the various elements in this section
will be explored in section 3.3.
133.3 Interpretation
The starting point for the interpretation of the model derived in section 3.2 is the
logarithm of the indirect utility, plus random term, in (3.4). This expression is in
principle suitable for econometric estimation, as demonstrated in Timmins (2003)
and Bayer et al. (2005). The simpliﬁcation to identical individuals is one step
towards a theoretical interpretation, closer to Alonso (1964). The only individual
element is the idiosyncratic component εij deﬁning an extra preference by indi-
vidual i for location j, that cannot be related to the local quality level, qj, by the
observer. At the end of section 3.2 this component is assumed to be zero again,
implying a population of truly identical agents.
The reason of resorting temporarily to this error term is twofold. First, it is used in
the original econometric setting of conditional logit, leading to a choice probability
(3.5), that in turn can be interpreted as a population density. The second reason
is developed further in Grevers and van der Veen (2005). When relating the
density/probability of (3.5) to local demand, as in (3.10), the demand function
shows a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) between the various locations.
This is a general property of a multinomial logit function, relating logit to product
diﬀerentiation (Anderson et al., 1992). Therefore, an alternative way of deriving
the social welfare function, (3.3), resembles the derivation of demand and supply
for a Dixit-Stiglitz sub-utility function of product variety nested in a Cobb-Douglas
utility function in Fujita et al. (1999, chapter 4). The utility function at this stage
could also be thought of as the direct utility of a representative consumer and is
written as
U = αˆ S
βZ
1−β. (3.17)
The utility function contains the following CES sub-utility function for quality-























With σ ≡ 1
1−ρ as the elasticity of substitution in (3.18), it can be shown that for
the corresponding elasticity in (3.10): σ =
β
µ. Therefore, if µ ↓ 0, σ → ∞, or ρ ↑ 1.
This implies that if εij ↓ 0, all locations become perfect substitutes. The indi-
viduals will nevertheless sort themselves over the various locations, because of the
supply constraint, Aij = A, at each location. This supply constraint is essentially
the same as in the discussion of the Alonso model in Fujita and Thisse (2002, p.82).
The role of the amenity level qj in (3.14) can be thought of as an analogy of the
distance to the Central Business District (CBD) in the model by Alonso (1964).
Depicted in ﬁg. 1, it is shown how the population in equilibrium is distributed
according to a positive relation between amenity level and population density.
Figure 1 about here
Also, related to (3.17), the price index P in (3.15) is a simpliﬁed version of the
price index in the Dixit-Stiglitz model (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). Its main use
in this paper, is to illustrate the dependence of social welfare on the number of
locations, M. This parameter will be the main reference in the welfare analysis in
section 4.
154 Welfare analysis
The basis type of welfare analysis concerns the application of (3.15) according to
(3.2). With a change in quality level at location l, the price index—accounting for




















The willingness to pay for this change—adjusting for changes in land prices ac-
cording to (4.1)—is determined by the level of welfare in spatial equilibrium. From
a public sector economics point of view, it is also important whether this spatial
equilibrium reﬂects an optimal use of land.
Going back to the individual problem (3.8) in subsection 3.2, the distribution of
the population in the equilibrium of (3.14) results from a two stage optimisation
problem. First, the consumer optimises the amount of land at every location, sj,
relative to the num´ eraire, z. In the second stage, the optimal location is chosen.
Since it was assumed that all individuals are identical, because of εij ↓ 0, the
individual second is basically indiﬀerent to the various locations. Stated diﬀerently,
the real decentralised optimisation is reﬂected in the ﬁrst stage. This conforms to
the market equilibrium.
In order asses the eﬃciency of the land use, the market equilibrium will be com-
pared with the optimal solution to the problem of a social planner. First, it will
be assumed that the number of locations, M, is ﬁxed. For the benevolent social














































This follows from the fact—as was shown in section 3.3—that assuming εij ↓ 0
implies that the subutility function (3.18) reﬂects a choice between perfect sub-
stitutes (i.e., become linear). Alternatively, it might be interpreted as the social




all j. Given the supply constraint (3.11), there is no degree of freedom left and the
solution to the centralised problem (4.3) is the as the solution to the decentralised













However, since the welfare level also depends on the number of locations, M, the
question arrises how the welfare level is related to an optimal number of locations.
In urban economics literature, the city border is usually deﬁned by
pM ≥ pA. (4.6)
Condition (4.6) is inspired by the urban economics literature where a similar ex-
pression determines the city border, as the rent from agricultural use is assumed
to higher beyond it (see e.g. Fujita and Thisse (2002, p.82)). For the land owner,
this agricultural rent count as opportunity costs. Condition (4.6) appears in the
second stage of the decentralised problem, as
17˜ pl ≡ max{pl,pA}. (4.7)
This rent should be taken into account by the individual, altering (3.4):
lnvj = lny − β ln[max{pj,pA}] + γ lnqj + εij, (4.8)
Inserting (4.8) in (3.5) results in a problem that can be solved numerically. Given
the fact, derived above, that the centralised problem is essentially the same as the
decentralised problem, taking into account condition (4.7) will lead to an eﬃcient
allocation of land. This extends the results in the literature for the Alonso type of
framework (Fujita and Thisse, 2002) to locational sorting models, conditional on
the number of locations, M, being endogenous. Stated diﬀerently, an endogenous
number of locations is necessary for deriving a GE-WTP based on two eﬃcient
spatial equilibria. Establishing a value for a GE-WTP on the current land use
implicitly assumes that—in absence of agglomeration externalities—the current
total amount of land used is optimal.
Locational sorting models are mainly applied in case of endogenous amenities
(Timmins, 2003; Bayer et al., 2005). The type model can be illustrated by a
simpliﬁed version of (3.4):
lnvj = lny − β lnpj + γ lnqj + δlnxj + εij, (4.9)
Here, xj is the local population density, directly aﬀecting the individual level of
utility. Depending on the sign of δ it is an agglomeration or a congestion eﬀect. It
can be interpreted as an externality in terms of social (or non-market) interaction
(Brock and Durlauf, 2003). Taking the third and the fourth term on the righthand
18side of (4.9) together as γ lnqjxδ
j and inserting Nxjsj = A for the individual
problem the direct utility (3.8) can be rewritten as






Now a diﬀerence will appear between the market equilibrium and the social op-
timum. For the individual the amenity level, qj(sj), will remain exogenous, not
aﬀecting her optimisation problem. This is by deﬁnition the case, since it concerns
an externality. The social planner, however, could optimise the individual amount











= βy − pjsj − ej(sj) = 0. (4.11)
Here, the sign of e is based on a positive externality (δ > 0 in (4.9)). Because
dq(xj)
dxj > 0, it follows that
dq(sj)
dsj < 0. The individual demand that would correspond
to the optimisation by a social planner will in case of a positive externality therefore
be smaller than in the original problem without externalities (keeping the prices





Denoting the solution to (4.12) by s∗
j, keeping the supply of land per location at
A, from (3.13) it follows that the optimal price p∗
j will be higher than the market
price, because the local density will be higher. For a ﬁxed population size, N, and
allowing for the number of locations, M, to be endogenous—as above—, higher
densities imply a lower M. This corresponds to the general notion that if positive
19externalities are internalised in the price of land an eﬃcient allocation of land will
yield a smaller agglomeration than in market equilibrium (Fujita and Thisse, 2002,
p. 179-182).
205 Conclusions
This paper demonstrates how so-called locational sorting models can be interpreted
in terms of land use models in traditional urban economics. Locational sorting
models are recently introduced location choice models that help extending hedonic
pricing methods for valuation of the beneﬁts from non-marginal changes in local
environmental quality. By adding the notion of total amount of consumed land
from urban economics, quality and quantity aspects of land use are be combined
in one consistent welfare measure.
For models that allow for agglomeration externalities—or social interactions—a
distinction arises between the socially optimal and the market equilibrium. In the
presence of externalities, the market allocation generally results in an oversupply
of land.
Allowing for an endogenous total land consumption in locational sorting models
will have direct the welfare implications, thereby aﬀecting the measure of a WTP
for non-marginal changes in local public good levels. An sorting model, as devel-
oped in this paper, that also reﬂects the optimality of the amount of land used in
equilibrium will simultaneously address two aspects of a socially optimal allocation
of land public policy is confronted with:
1. securing optimal allocation of land by markets,
2. supplying local public goods.
Given the original econometric context wherein locational sorting model were de-
veloped, an empirical implementation of the concepts developed here are expected
to be feasible and an exciting route towards further applied economic land use
research.
21Figure 1: Example of a population distribution with N = 10000 cf. (3.4) with
β = 0.5, γ = 0.2 and µ = 0 (q decreases stepwise from 2.5 in steps of 0.1).
22A Appendix
In this appendix, the analytical solution for the population frequency distribution














































































 1/µ µ/(β+µ). (A.4)
Finally, using the identity
 M
j=1xj = 1, (A.5)











































































The equivalence follows from lacking a degree of freedom in maximising ˆ S because
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